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The question of the origin of consciousness has engaged sci-
entists and philosophers for centuries. Early scholars relied on
introspection, leading some to conclude that attention is neces-
sary for consciousness, and in some cases equating attention and
consciousness. Such a tight relationship between attention and
consciousness has also been proposed by many modern theo-
rists (Posner, 1994; Merikle and Joordens, 1997; Mack and Rock,
1998; Chun andWolfe, 2000; O’Regan andNoe, 2001;Mole, 2008;
De Brigard and Prinz, 2010; Prinz, 2011; Cohen et al., 2012).
The relationship between attention and consciousness has come
under increasing scrutiny with the development of neuroscien-
tific methods. In modern neuroscience, the effects of attention are
often objectively defined and measured as reduced reaction time
and improved performance. Similarly, conscious awareness of an
object is established by a subjective report in combination with
objective forced-choice performance (Seth et al., 2008; Sandberg
et al., 2011). With these measures in place, a variety of meth-
ods has been used to manipulate attention (e.g., cueing, divided
attention, etc.) and consciousness [e.g., masking, crowding, and
binocular rivalry (Kim and Blake, 2005)]. These empirical studies
have culminated in recent proposals that attention and conscious-
ness are supported by different neuronal processes and they are
not necessarily correlated all the time (Iwasaki, 1993; Baars, 1997;
Hardcastle, 1997; Kentridge et al., 1999; Naccache et al., 2002;
Lamme, 2003; Woodman and Luck, 2003; Bachmann, 2006; Koch
and Tsuchiya, 2007; van Boxtel et al., 2010).
Our original motivation to edit this Research Topic was three-
fold: (1) to gather and collect current, diverse views on the
relationship between consciousness and attention, (2) to invite
reviews on consciousness and attention in non-vision modalities,
(3) and to invite empirical studies of consciousness and attention.
As summarized below, our goals are largely achieved thanks to 17
contributions to this issue.
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATTENTION
Posner (2012) sets the stage for the discussion by distinguish-
ing different ways in which “consciousness” and “attention” are
used colloquially. Clarifying the three senses of consciousness,
namely, the level or state of consciousness (as in coma, sleep, or
awake), sensory awareness (or contents of consciousness), and
voluntary control, Posner claims that the neuronal mechanisms
that support each type of consciousness overlap with those for a
distinct type of attention: alerting, orienting, and executive atten-
tion, respectively. Chennu and Bekinschtein (2012) investigate the
workings of attention at different levels or states of conscious-
ness. Reviewing the mismatch negativity in the auditory oddball
paradigm, they survey evidence for dissociations and parallels
between bottom-up and top-down attention and the level of con-
sciousness. Marchetti (2012) largely agrees with Posner (2012),
emphasizing the variety in types of attention and consciousness.
By considering each type, Marchetti argues that consciousness is
always associated with some kind of attention and attention is
always associated with some kind of conscious perception. Chica
and Bartolomeo (2012) dissect attention into endogenous/top-
down and exogenous/bottom-up components, considering their
relation with consciousness. They claim that endogenous atten-
tion is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness agreeing
with some views (e.g., Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; van Boxtel et al.,
2010) while exogenous attention is necessary (but not sufficient)
for consciousness (also see Hsu et al., 2011). They note the pre-
frontal parietal network (PPN) as central for both exogenous
spatial attention and conscious perception. The importance of the
PPN is also stressed by Bor and Seth (2012), who review recent
empirical studies for identifying potential neuronal correlates of
consciousness (NCCs). Based on the fact that the PPN has been
commonly identified as the neuronal correlate for both atten-
tion and consciousness (Rees and Lavie, 2001), they suggest that
attention is an important and necessary aspect of consciousness.
As the PPN is also associated with working memory, executive
control, and chunking, they argue that these cognitive functions,
including attention, make up the core psychological components
of consciousness. A contrasting view on the role of the PPN
is provided by Tallon-Baudry (2011), who argues against the
tight relationship between consciousness and attention. She raises
several issues about the interpretation of previous results with
respect to the PPN. For example, many previous experiments did
not independently manipulate both attention and consciousness.
To explain recent neural findings pointing to a dissociation of
attention and consciousness, she proposes “a cumulative influ-
ence model,” where both attention and consciousness contribute
to the final stage of decision making through independent paths.
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Two novel theoretical ideas are put forward in this Research
Topic. Hohwy (2012) proposes a framework based on predic-
tive coding (Rao, 2005; Friston, 2009), where attention optimizes
expectations about perceptual precisions, while conscious percep-
tion is a result of the prediction error minimization. Bachmann
(2011) proposes to broaden the research view from focusing on
modality-specific and feature-specific effects of attention to inter-
modal effects of attention on consciousness. He concludes that
attention and consciousness are separable and that consciousness
can come about without selective attention. As Bachmann points
out, the articles introduced so far build their theories mostly
on the experimental evidence obtained in the visual modality.
Next we will overview the articles looking outside the visual
modality.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATTENTION IN NON-VISION FIELDS
Snyder et al. (2012) review recent experiments in auditory neu-
roscience, which investigated how conscious auditory perception
is influenced by various high-level factors, including attention.
They also review a variety ofmethods, includingmultistable stim-
uli and masking phenomena in the auditory domain, which will
allow future research to shed a new light on the overlap in the
neuronal mechanisms of attention and consciousness in audition
and vision.
Keller (2011) explores the potential law-like relation between
attention and consciousness in olfaction. As olfaction is very
different from vision in several aspects (e.g., lack of spatial speci-
ficity, no object as a unit for selection, etc.), the concept of atten-
tion is clarified in comparison with that in vision. Then, Keller
goes on to speculate about possible neuronal loci for attentional
selection and conscious processing for olfaction. He concludes
that attention is necessary for olfactory consciousness.
Lou et al. (2011) and De Brigard (2012) extend the discussion
into non-sensory modalities. Lou et al. (2011) examine the role
of the brain regions that locate around the midline, (i.e., paralim-
bic, resting-state, or default-mode network) in self-awareness and
self-control, concluding that the network integrates attention,
awareness and emotion to allocate brain resources. Looking at
memory research, De Brigard (2012) dissect the kinds of attention
important for memories. De Brigard follows the recent proposal
for a distinction between internal and external attention (Chun
et al., 2011) and argues that internal attention is necessary, but
probably not sufficient, for conscious retrieval of memories.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS
The Research Topic concludes with several empirical studies.
While top-down selective attention is commonly assumed to be
required to bind features into objects, Rosenholtz et al. (2012)
argue that recent changes in the understanding of peripheral
vision provides an alternative view. Their texture tiling model
[also see perceptual metamers (Freeman and Simoncelli, 2011)]
successfully explains why complex tasks, such as pop-out in visual
search and natural scene categorization (Li et al., 2002), can be
performed well in the periphery where the accuracy of infor-
mation is severely impaired. Their model does not resort to
top-down attention in accomplishing the complex visual tasks.
Moutoussis (2012) reviews the findings on perceptual timing
and binding of visual features, concluding that misbinding illu-
sions are due to differences in neural processing times as well
as exogenous attention. Perry and Fallah (2012) conducted a
psychophysics study to investigate the influence of bottom-up and
top-down attention on a visual illusion called “motion direction
repulsion.” They found that attentional manipulation via color
affects processing speed without changing the conscious percep-
tion of motion. Delevoye-Turrell and Bobineau (2012) investi-
gated the effects of lowered and heightened attention on motor
consciousness using ametacognitive approach (e.g., reproduction
of a motion trajectory) for reflex-like stimulus-based and delib-
erate intention-based actions. Reproduction quality depended
on how skillful subjects were in meditation, presumably reflect-
ing the effectiveness of attentional control on the body. Finally,
Willenbockel et al. (2012) recorded intracranial neuronal activity
from the insula and amygdala of awake human patients to char-
acterize the effects of visibility using continuous flash suppression
(Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005) as well as using spatial-frequency
“bubbles” (Willenbockel et al., 2010). They found that low spa-
tial frequency information of invisible faces distinctively activated
these regions and that activation by invisible faces precedes those
evoked by visible faces.
QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES
Over all the articles collected here, the most recurring issue
is whether attention is necessary for conscious perception
(Bachmann, 2011; Keller, 2011; Tallon-Baudry, 2011; Bor
and Seth, 2012; Chennu and Bekinschtein, 2012; Chica and
Bartolomeo, 2012; De Brigard, 2012; Marchetti, 2012; Posner,
2012; Rosenholtz et al., 2012). There are two aspects in this
debate.
First, the role of the PPN for attention and consciousness is
disputed (Tallon-Baudry, 2011; Bor and Seth, 2012; Chica and
Bartolomeo, 2012). While meta-analyses of studies on conscious-
ness and (exogenous) attention (Bor and Seth, 2012; Chica and
Bartolomeo, 2012) point to a large overlap in the PPN for both
attention and consciousness, Tallon-Baudry (2011) argues that
not all the experiments have shown consciousness-related acti-
vation in the PPN (e.g., Tse et al., 2005), that some of the PPN
activation may be related to a confound related to report or res-
olution of conflict (Knapen et al., 2011; van Boxtel and Tsuchiya,
2013), and that most studies did not independently manipulate
attention and consciousness. These are all empirical issues, which
can be relatively easy to address in the future studies.
The second issue is a bit trickier. Some claim that attention is
always necessary, not only for vision but also for olfaction (Keller,
2011) and memory (De Brigard, 2012). Such an argument could
be countered by everyday examples, such as peripheral vision
(Rosenholtz et al., 2012), unexpected strong olfactory stimuli
(Keller, 2011), and the feeling of familiarity (De Brigard, 2012),
all of which appear to give rise to conscious experience without
deliberate attentional amplification. This view is also supported
by conscious perception of an isolated stimulus, because top-
down attention can function when only the sensory inputs are
competing with each other (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; van Boxtel
et al., 2010). However, it is possible to argue that even these cases
require some amount of attention, because attention is present
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everywhere in some diffuse way (De Brigard and Prinz, 2010;
Keller, 2011; Cohen et al., 2012; Marchetti, 2012).
Currently, no psychophysical experimentation in humans can
prove or disprove such a hypothesis, as it seems impossible to
induce the state of no attention in humans. However, the advent
of optogenetics in animal research might allow us to create a sit-
uation where no attentional activation, fed back from the PPN,
arrives at the visual cortex (Tsuchiya et al., 2012). It remains
to be seen if such animals without (top-down) attention can
consciously see an isolated object or not.
Even if it turns out animals can visually perceive an iso-
lated object without top-down attention, it remains unclear if
inter-modal attention is required for conscious perception in
a non-dominant modality, such as olfaction and memory. It
is plausible that regardless of the inputs, there may be always
competition between modalities (e.g., dominant vision vs. non-
dominant olfaction) and between times (e.g., dominant present
vs. non-dominant past memory or future planning). By default,
the dominant modality may be a winning coalition (i.e., present
visual input) requiring nearly no top-down attentional amplifica-
tion to be consciously experienced while non-dominant modali-
ties might require some level of attentional amplification to reach
consciousness.
We hope these articles will inspire the readers for further
conceptual and empirical work on the issue of the relationship
between consciousness and attention. Untangling this relation
is the necessary step toward uncovering the neuronal basis of
consciousness.
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